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Abstract 
This paper attempts to explain the economic effects of French direct investment in 
China on the French economy, based on our survey results using the relative data and 
case study. The paper begins with a brief description of the scale, location, industries, 
firms and forms of French direct investment in China, and then explains the economic 
effects of French FDI in China on both nations, such as the employment and income, 
import and export, balance of payments, industry hollowing, technological 
improvement, and others. Finally, the paper provides a case study about the success 
of Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd, one of EJV of Sino French Water 
Development Company Ltd. 
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* This paper was originally prepared for International Conference in France, 2005. 
† The East Asia Economic Research Group was established in July 2005, providing a focal point for 
East Asia-related research of an economic nature, primarily conducted by academic staff of the School 
of Economics at Shandong University and The University of Queensland, their research collaborators 
and other interested contributors. 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In October, 2004, Kearney, a famous strategic management consulting company, 
ranked China the most popular FDI destination for a that third time, indicating that 
China still lead USA and other nations in the confidence of global investors. 
 
We note that France, as an established industrialized nation, has been playing an 
important role in the global FDI, but lacked of great interests in investing in China. 
From 2001 to 2003, only 0.5 percent of French direct investment had flowed into 
China (Banque de France, 2005). By the end of 2003, only 1.23 percent of FDI into 
China had come from France (MofCom of China, 2005). In recent years, French 
direct investment into China has been increasing rapidly, but still does not catch up 
with the average growth speed of FDI inflow into China. This kind of phenomenon 
has not only prevented France from benefiting most from FDI, but also blocked China 
to raise the quality of FDI. 
 
We first, in Section 2, will describe the scale, location, industries, firms and forms of 
French direct investment in China, using a comprehensive panel data over the recent 
years from MofCom of China and comparing them with other EU nations such as 
Britain and Germany. In Section 3, we explain the economic effects of French direct 
investment in China on both nations, such as the employment and income, import and 
export, balance of payments, industry hollowing, technological improvement, among 
others. Section 4 draws some conclusions and puts forward policy suggestions. 
Appendix offers a case study about the success of Qingdao Hairun Water Supply 
Corp. Ltd, one of EJV of Sino French Water Development Company Ltd., which 
comes out of investigation and suggests that there exist great potentials for French 
enterprises to enter China if they adopt the appropriate strategies and keep good 
relationships with the host nation. 
 
2.  BASIC FACTS 
(1) Scale of French direct investment in China 
Table 1 indicates that considering the FDI stock, the accumulative amount of French 
projects in China had been 2,591, with the contractual amount of $9.14 billion and 2 
actual amount of $ 6.9 billion by the end of 2004, ranking the 10
th in the countries 
investing in China. This scale of French direct investment not only fell behind USA 
and Japan, but also lagged behind UK and Germany. If only the actual amount is 
considered, it amounted to 1/2 that of UK and 2/3 that of Germany. 
 
Table 1: FDI Stock in China by Five Countries at the End of 2004 

























Source: MofCom of China, 2005. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that French direct investment has increased rapidly since 
1997 when we consider the FDI inflow. The average annual growth rate has been 7.78 
percent from 2001 to 2004, which has exceeded that of UK and Germany at the same 
period, but still can not compare with the average annual growth rate of 10 percent of 
FDI into China during the same period (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005). 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005. 
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(2) Industry distribution 
Figure 2 indicates that French direct investment has focused mainly on manufacturing 
industries such as chemical, automobile, machinery, food, and so on, which accounted 
for 56 percent of total stock, with that in energy, finance and enterprise service 
accounting for 16 percent, 12 percent and 9 percent respectively. That is to say, 
French direct investment in the second industry accounts for more than 70 percent of 
its total, which was consistent with not only that of Germany ( 80 percent in 2002), 
but also the general case of FDI in China (75 percent in 2004). National Development 
and Reform Commission of China (2003) also found that the direct investment of EU 
including France in China chose the second industry as the investing priority and was 
intended to occupy the market, of which 59 percent was targeted at Chinese market, 
19 percent at EU market, 15 percent at Asia-Pacific market and 17 percent at North 
America market.  
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Source: Banque de France, 2005 
 
(3) Major French Firms in China 
At present, French direct investment into China is undertaken mainly by more than 20 
large-size French enterprises groups, such as Electricite De France, Suez, Alcatel 
Telecom, Michelin, Total Oil, Rhodia, Aventis, Lafarge, Saint-Gobain, Thomson, 
Scheider Electric, Alstom, Carrefour, Veolia Environment, Groupe Danone, Loreal, 
Psa Peugeot Citroen, BNP, Paribas, Crédit Lyonnais, Air France etc. Since 1990s’, 
these enterprise groups began to gain in succession. In some industries, the market 4 
shares taken by them have been considerably large. For example, Groupe Danone sold 
28 billion liter of water in China, and its market share amounted to 40 percent in 
2003. Psa Peugeot Citroen has been the second largest enterprise in the automobile 
market with a sales income of 1.21 billion dollars and occupied the market share of 9 
percent (CCPIT, 2005). 
 
(4) Location of French direct investment in China 
French enterprises paid more attention to the conglomeration effects of FDI when 
choosing the location. Therefore, they usually choose the most developed Eastern 
Regions such as Shanghai and Guangzhou and benefit from the radiation of this 
district. The former National Economy and Trade Commission (2001) observed that 
75.95 percent of contractual amount of French direct investment had flowed into 
Eastern District, only 24.05 percent into Middle and Western Regions. 
 
A fresh trend has been observed that some western cities such as Chongqing have 
become the new targets of French direct investment in recent years. According to 
Chongqing Foreign Economy and Trade Commission, 24 French enterprises with 
contractual amount of $35.59 million had settled there by the end of Oct. 2003. 
(5) Forms of French direct investment in China 
At the beginning stage, most of French enterprises availed themselves of the forms of 
Equity Joint Venture (EJV) or Contractual Joint Venture (CJV) in entering into China. 
For example, Sino French Water Development Company Ltd. established EJV in 18 
large cities, supplying water and dealing with polluted water. With the accumulation 
of FDI experiences, these French enterprises adopted the more flexible forms 
including M&A. For example, Michelin consolidated its four EJV in China in 2002, 
and became a Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) in Aug, 2003. Loreal acquired 
Little Nurse and  YUE-SAI (China) successfully. After Groupe Danone acquired 
Wahaha and Robust, two famous Chinese enterprises, it also bought the shares of 
Bright, another famous Chinese enterprise, and became the third stockholder at the 
end of 2004.  
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The reasons why only a limited number of French enterprises have entered into China 
are complex, mainly including the following aspects. 
 
Firstly, before 1994 when FDI into China pyramided, France was sluggish in FDI in 
China due to the political divergence between two governments. That is to say, it was 
very late that French enterprises entered into China, which makes a sharp contrast 
with UK and Germany who regarded China as preferred choice of their international 
strategy early in 1980s’ and 1990s’. Since 1994, the investment cooperation between 
French and China has still been restrained by multiple factors. (1) Most of investment 
projects between the two countries belong to public investments. French government 
succeeded in a few large-scale projects, but the beneficiaries of these projects were 
confined to a few French large-size enterprises. Moreover, the continuity and spillover 
effects of this kind of investment were very weak so that it failed to help to attract 
followers for other investment. (2) French enterprises still stuck to the inadequate 
understanding of China so that they were afraid of the inefficiency of Chinese 
government and the discontinuity of China’s foreign policy. As a result, they hesitated 
in making more investment in China. (3) French government has established the 
perfect supporting system for overseas investment, but no special support for FDI into 
China. On the contrary, both Germany and Italy governments call upon the large-size 
enterprises positively to adopt their marketing channels and information, and boost 
the medium and small-size enterprises to exploit Chinese market well. In France, only 
few large-size enterprises did so and only few banks were willing to offer the long-
term loans for the medium- and small-size enterprises to invest beyond the EU 
market.  
 
Secondly, France has concentrated its direct investment in Europe and North America 
for a long time, the two regions combined accounting for more than 3/4 of its total 
FDI. Table 2 shows the sharp contrast among French, UK and Germany direct 
investments in East Asia excluding Japan. In 1990s’, only 2.5 percent of total French 
direct investment flowed into East Asia, against 8 percent and 5 percent for UK and 
Germany respectively. The main reason is that France is not interested in making FDI 
in the Emerging Markets including China. Figure 3 indicates that the proportion of 
total French direct investments flowing into new members of EU, India and China 6 
was 7 percent from 1983 to 2003, but that of USA, Germany and UK registered 20 
percent, 14 percent and 9 percent respectively over the same period.  
 
Table 2: Proportion of Three Countries’ FDI in East Asia Excluding Japan 
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Source: Banque de France, “Offshoring”, Banque de France Bulletin Digest, No.133, January 2005, 
pp.21-35. 
 
Thirdly, French enterprises have been attaching greater importance to the cluster 
effects when choosing the location of investment. Disdier and Mayer (2003) 
discovered that the probability of French enterprises investing in one country would 
rise by 4.5 percent to 4.9 percent if other French enterprises in the same industry in 
this country rose by 10 percent. Due to the limited quantity of French enterprises in 
China at present, relatively few French enterprises intend to enter here. At the same 
time, geographic distance and cultural differences between two countries are also the 
important factors affecting French enterprises’ decision. Consequently, the majority of 
them do not favor China as the preferred investment destination. 
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3.  COST-BENEFIT (CBA) ANALYSIS  
Above all, we can note that, on one hand, as a developed country with high taxation, 
high welfare and slow growth, French economic development nowadays is restricted 
by lots of factors.  
•  French industries have the limited competitive advantages in hi-tech due to the 
lack of R&D. 
•  Its export commodities with medium added value failed in the fierce 
competition with the emerging nations, which could be justified by the fact that 
French trade deficit reached a record high of 11 billion Euros in the first half 
year of 2005.  
•  The slow growth of resident consumption and rising productive costs led to the 
contraction of enterprise investment in France. 
•  The high unemployment rate of 10 percent has become the bottle-neck of 
French economy. Therefore, French enterprises should expand FDI due to the 
domestic factor endowments and market conditions.  
 
On the other hand, China has some advantages which can satisfy the need of French 
investors.  
•  Cost advantages. Blanco etal (2005) showed that the productive costs could be 
reduced by 85-90 percent if French transferred its capital into China, but only 
by 65-75 percent into North Africa and Middle-and-East Europe.  
•  Efficiency advantage. Some French enterprises having settled in China found 
that the productive efficiency of Chinese workers with low wages is not lower 
than that of Europe.  
•  Market potential. For example, it was reported that Scheider Electric still could 
not meet the market demand in China, even if it had established 11 factories. 
Groupe Danone has regarded Chinese market as the second largest in the world. 
Based on these advantages, French direct investment, when coupled with 
appropriate strategies in China, will guarantee great benefit for individual 
enterprises and inevitably boost the French economic development.  
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It should not be denied that French economy will suffer some loss in this course. The 
question remains whether the benefits are greater than the costs. 
 
(1) Economic benefits 
•  Technological improvement and industrial upgrade 
On one hand, the benefits gained from the direct investment in traditional industries in 
China can be used to develop the emerging industries such as hi-tech, which will help 
to perfect the industrial structure in France. On the other hand, French enterprises 
must increase R&D to keep a leading position in the fierce competition in the Chinese 
market, which will eventually foster technological improvement in France. Jiang 
(2004) observed that almost all the multinational enterprises in China had adopted the 
most advanced technology which their parent companies were using, and half of 
which was ushered less than 2 years ago in the home country. The same is true of the 
computer industry of USA, which has been developing rapidly mostly due to the 
migration towards other countries in the form of FDI. 
 
•  Ex-import and BOP 
Fontagne and Pajot (1997) observed that French trade surplus would rise by 35 cents 
if it increased FDI by $1, even rise by 40 percents if considering the relevant effects. 
The observation will be proved true if French direct investment flows into China. In 
the short run, French enterprises must export large amount of machinery, special 
materials and inputs to fulfill the localization in China. In the long run, the importance 
of French ex-import in China will become greater, because most of Chinese trade 
partners are its major investing countries such as USA and Japan. From another point 
of view, this is also the best way for French enterprises to cast off the price 
competition with the developing countries in the traditional industries and enhance the 
competitive advantages of its export commodities. 
 
•  Employment and income 
It was estimated that French direct investment in China can bring 25 jobs for France if 
it can create 100 jobs for China. Blanco etal (2005) found that French direct 
investment in emerging nations can not only bring more jobs, but also better the 9 
employment structure. In the above example about the FDI of USA computer 
industry, jobs with high income level such as computer engineers and Internet system 
analysts expanded rapidly. According to the European Bureau of Statistics (2005), 
French workers, although with higher productivity than Britain, Germany, USA and 
Japan, had to accept lower level income. Obviously, the perfection of employment 
structure will increase these workers’ income significantly. Otherwise, unemployment 
would exacerbate due to the bankruptcy of traditional industries in the fierce 
competition.  
 
(2) Economic costs 
In the course of French direct investment in China, France has to face some economic 
costs, mainly manifested by the proliferation of friction unemployment and 
deterioration of balance of payments. That is, reducing the staff trimmers due to 
French direct investment will render some unskilled labors out of work for whom it is 
very difficult to find new jobs; French direct investment will lead to the effect of 
export substitution, i.e., the export from traditional industries will decline and the 
import of them will increase correspondingly; it needs much longer time to cultivate 
the emerging industries so that it is impossible to increase the export of hi-tech in the 
short run.  
 
However, it should be clear that most of these costs exist only in the short run. 
Moreover, French government is good at regulating the macro economy with 
reasonable policies so that it can reduce the FDI costs to the lowest.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
It is well known that French direct investment is beneficial to the quality improvement 
of FDI and the sustainable economic development of China.  
 
On one hand, Chinese government is endeavoring to improve the quality of FDI, 
which France is certainly able to assist. (1) The rate of French actual investment was 
as high as 74.4 percent at the end of 2004, but that of average was only 60.58 percent 
at the same period (MofCom of China, 2004). (2) The scale of technology transfer to 
China by France is only nest to that of Germany among the members of EU. (3) 10 
French passion to invest in China’s Western Regions is helpful to lesson the 
disequilibrium of economic development facing China.  
 
On the other hand, energy supply and environment protection have become the two 
obstacles to China’s economic growth. In contrast, French enterprises have got 
significant advantages in such fields. For example, France has got the most advanced 
technology in the construction of high-speed road; such famous enterprises as Suez 
and Veolia Environment have got know-how in the field of water supply and 
environment protection; French enterprises has ever participated in the construction of 
Chinese power plants including Daya Bay nuclear plant and Ling’ao nuclear station; 
Areva, with the title of “Queen of nuclear power” has the ambition to build nine new 
EJV in China.  
 
Therefore, Chinese government should take some positive measures for French direct 
investment in China. To begin with, Chinese government should establish a special 
agency to offer consulting service, regarding issues like helping French enterprises 
understand Chinese market potential and investment climate. Chinese government 
should also adopt supportive policies regarding providing the information, finance 
support, and other assistance for French small-and-medium enterprises to enter 
Chinese market. In addition, Chinese government should make further efforts to 
enforce the protection of intelligent property rights, considering the fact that many 
French enterprises that have entered or will enter China take the form of technological 
cooperation.  11 
APPENDIX 
Case Study----Sino French Water Development Company in Qingdao
∗ 
 
Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd, established by Sino French Water 
Development Company and Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd., is the first 
Sino-foreign joint enterprise engaging in public utility in Qingdao. Put into operation 
formally in August, 2002, this co-partnership company poured into the total assets of 
22.5 billion Yuan and held by each side with 50 percent shares. 
 
So far Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd has made the very considerable 
benefit with the annual return rate of 8 percent or so each year. With this speed, the 
company can be expected to cover the cost of investment in 10 years. Such successful 
operation of this company is due to both the rational strategies in itself and the 
effective relationship with the local government. 
 
The analyses in detail follow below: 
•  The company has been adopting the advanced techniques and its products 
sharing good quality. With the advanced techniques and equipment from France 
and German Siemens, the company can supply water of high quality. The turbid 
degree of water is not higher than 0.5 ntu, which is much lower than the 
Chinese current water supply standard (below 3 ntu) and nearly reaches 
European Union’s standard. The local government and consumers show their 
approval on the quality of the water. 
•  The employment of the original workers was arranged rationally. After the co-
operation the company did not reduced the staff at will to cause a large amount 
of unemployment. On the opposite, all the 319 workers have found their 
suitable new positions on the different levels according to their abilities. Even 
the unaccomplished workers can earn their lives as dustmen or something else. 
•  Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd has been insisting on the idea of long-
term investment. The additional investment of the company was 9 million Yuan 
in 2003. With the renovated equipment and technological transformation, water 
                                                 
∗ All the data was obtained from two field surveys in Qingdao Hairun Water Supply Corp. Ltd in March 
2003 and November 2003. 12 
purification of every 1000 cubic meters reduces both the usage of electricity 
about 30 degrees and the usage of chlorine by 1/3. In fact, these additional 
investments were not carried on the regulation in joint-venture’s contract, and 
as a result the company received the high appreciation of the local government 
and people. The brand of the Sino-French Water Company has been 
strengthened. 
•  The localization of the management. The administrators of the company have 
established good relationship with the local responsible department of the 
government; their personality glamour has played an important role in the 
process of managing workers. 
 
As a result, the local government has also made some positive measures in favor of 
the Sino-French Water Company. Considering the high cost of the original water in 
Qingdao (especially in some specific seasons), which may increase the cost of the 
company, the local government gave up the routine method which prescribed a fixed 
price of 2.5-3 Yuan per square water all the year, but charge this company nearly 0.6 
Yuan per square water only to make up for the cost of water. This method has 
avoided the loss risk caused by the season factors on the Sino-French Water 
Company and made it undertaken by the local government voluntarily. 
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